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Abstract
According to the favorite-longshot bias observed in parimutuel betting, the ﬁnal
distribution of bets overestimates the winning chance of longshots. This paper pro-
poses an explanation of this bias based on late betting by small privately informed
bettors. These bettors have an incentive to protect their private information and bet
at the last minute, without knowing the bets simultaneously placed by the others.
Once the distribution of bets is revealed, if bets are more informative than noisy, all
bettors can recognize that the longshot is less likely to win than indicated by the
distrubution of bets.
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In parimutuel betting, a bet placed on an outcome entitles the bettors to an equal share of
the total money bet (“pool”) when that outcome is realized, after deductions for tax and
expenses (“track take”).1 Because the holders of winning tickets divide the pool, the payoﬀ
odds are determined by the proportion of bets on the diﬀerent outcomes. The distribution
of bets should then reﬂect the probability of each outcome as assessed by the market.
Starting with Griﬃth (1949), horse race betting data have been used to test this propo-
sition. Comparing the empirical winning chance with the proportion of money bet on the
horses, the market odds have been shown to be highly correlated with the empirical odds.
But according to the widely observed favorite-longshot bias, horses with short odds (i.e.,
favorites) win more even frequently than the odds indicate, while horses with long odds
(i.e., longshots) win less frequently. In some cases, even an uninformed bettor who only
observes the ﬁnal bet distribution may be able to proﬁt from placing an extra bet on the
favorite. The favorite-longshot bias is often seen as a challenge to traditional economic
theory, according to which the market mechanism should produce prices that eﬃciently
incorporate all information (Thaler and Ziemba (1988)).
This paper proposes a new explanation of the puzzle based on simultaneous last minute
betting by privately informed bettors. When many (few) players have bet on the same
outcome, now the favorite (longshot), each player learns that many (few) other players
possessed private information in favor of this outcome, and so they realize that they
should have bet even more (less) on this outcome. This is exactly the eﬀect captured by
the favorite-longshot bias. If the market closes immediately after the informed bets are
placed, the market’s tâtonnement process cannot incorporate this private information and
reach a rational expectations equilibrium.
Our explanation is compatible with the observation that the late bets contain a large
amount of information about the horses’ ﬁnishing order, as documented by Asch, Malkiel
and Quandt (1982). We show that the timing incentives depend on the presence of market
power and concerns about information revelation.2 On the one hand, bettors have an
incentive to bet early in order to prevent competitors from unfavorably changing the
1The main betting methods used in horse-race tracks are ﬁxed odds betting and parimutuel (or pool)
betting (cf. Dowie (1976)). In ﬁxed odds betting, bookmakers accept bets at speciﬁc, but changing, odds
throughout the betting period. This implies that the return to any individual bet is not aﬀected by bets
placed subsequently. In parimutuel betting, the return to a bet depends instead on the ﬁnal total bets
placed on the same horse, so that all bettors (but possibly the last one) do not know with certainty the
odds. Since its invention in France by Pierre Oller in the second half of the nineteenth century, parimutuel
betting has become the most common wagering procedure at major horse-racing tracks throughout the
world (but not in the UK, where ﬁxed odds betting attracts the lion’s share of the bets). It is also typically
adopted in greyhound tracks, jai alai games, soccer, basketball, and many other games.
2Alternatively, the bets placed at the end could be more informative because more information becomes
publicly available on the likely performance of the horses.
2odds. On the other hand, waiting is attractive because it allows bettors hide their own
private information and possibly glean information from others. When informed bettors
are “small”, the second eﬀect overrides the ﬁrst and bets are simultaneously placed at the
closing time.
The insights gained in our analysis of parimutuel markets with private information can
be applied to new markets for ﬁnancial hedging. As explained by Economides and Lange
(2001), the parimutuel mechanism is particularly apt for trading contingent claims and
has been recently employed in the Iowa Electronic Markets3 and Parimutuel Derivative
Call Auction markets.4 An advantage of these markets is that the intermediary managing
the parimutuel market is not exposed to any risk. On the ﬂip side, market participants
are subject to risk on the terms of trade and might have incentive to delay their orders.
Potters and Wit (1996) propose an explanation closely related to ours. Their privately
informed bettors are allowed the chance to adjust the bets at the ﬁnal market odds, but
ignore the information contained in the bets.5 In their setting, the favorite-longshot bias
arises as a deviation from the rational expectations equilibrium. Our bettors instead fully
understand the informational connection, but are not allowed to adjust their bets after
they observe the ﬁnal market odds. Feeney and King (2001) and Koessler and Ziegelmeyer
(2002) have also recently proposed game theoretic models of parimutuel betting with
asymmetric information, focusing mostly on the case of sequential betting with exogenous
order. We instead focus on simultaneous betting and oﬀer insights on the forces driving
the timing of bets.
A number of alternative theories have been formulated to explain the favorite-longshot
bias. First, Griﬃth (1949) suggested that individuals subjectively ascribe too large proba-
bilities to rare events. Second, Weitzman (1965) and Ali (1977) hypotesized that individual
bettors are risk loving, and so are willing to give up a larger expected payoﬀ when assuming
a greater risk (longer odds). Third, Isaacs (1953) noted that an informed monopolist bet-
tor would not bet until the marginal bet has zero value. Fourth, Hurley and McDonough
(1995) noted a sizeable track take limits the amount of arbitrage by bettors with superior
information and so tends to result in relatively too little bets placed on the favorites.6
Fifth, Shin (1991) and (1992) explained the favorite-longshot bias in ﬁxed odds betting as
a response of uninformed bookmakers to private information possessed by some bettors
3The Iowa Electricity Markets are real-money futures markets in which contract payoﬀs depend on
economic and political events such as elections. See http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem.
4Starting in October 2002, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs have been hosting Parimutuel Deriv-
ative Call Auctions of options on economic statistics. See Baron and Lange (2003) for a report on the
performance of these markets.
5Ali’s (1977) Theorem 2 also features privately information bettors who ignore the information of
others.
6For a more extensive review of these explanations see the survey by Sauer (1998).
3(“insiders”).7 See Section 6 for a more detailed discussion of the merits and shortcomings
of the diﬀerent theories.
Our ﬁndings are illustrated in the simplest setting with two horses. After formulating
t h em o d e li nS e c t i o n2 ,i nS e c t i o n3w ef o c u so nt h es i m p l ec a s eo fs i m u l t a n e o u sb e t t i n g
with a ﬁnite number of partially informed players deciding on which horse to place their
unit bets when the pool has no pre-existing bets and zero track take. By considering
t h ec a s ew i t haﬁnite number of players forced to bet simultaneously, we obtain a crisp
illustration of how the sign and magnitude of the favorite-longshot bias depends on the
informativeness of the signal and the number of players.
We then endogenize the timing, by allowing the players to decide when to publicly
place their bets. In general, bets not only aﬀect odds but also possibly reveal information
to the other bettors. We analyze these two eﬀects in isolation by considering in turn two
versions of the model. Section 4 shows that early betting results when players aﬀect the
market odds but are not concerned about revealing information.
In order to isolate the information revelation eﬀect and abstract from the individual
bettors’ eﬀect on odds, in Section 5 we then consider a continuum of small informed bettors.
The analysis of the dynamic betting game relies on the characterization of the equilibrium
in the static simultaneous betting game with positive track take and pre-existing bets. The
equilibrium of the dynamic game features an extreme form of delay, with small partially
informed bettors placing late bets. When analyzing the last minute betting game with a
continuum of players, we also obtain some testable comparative statics predictions of the
theory for changes in the amount of pre-existing bets, level of the track take, and mass
of informed bettors. We conclude in Section 6 by discussing the predictions of our theory
and some avenues for future research. The Appendix collects the more technical proofs.
2. Model
We consider a horse race with K =2horses. The outcome that horse x w i n st h er a c ei s
identiﬁed with the state, x ∈ {−1,1}.
The players are informed bettors (or insiders)o fs i z eN,e i t h e raﬁnite set {1,...,N}
(in Sections 3 and 4) or a continuous interval [0,N] (in Section 5). All players have a
common prior belief q =P r( x =1 ) , possibly formed after the observation of a common
signal. In addition, each player i is privately endowed with signal si.8 These signals are
assumed to be identically and independently distributed conditionally on state x.
7Relative to favorites, longshots attract a relatively higher proportion of insiders and pay out more
conditional on winning. To counteract this more severe adverse selection problem, posted odds on longshots
are relatively shorter. In a regular ﬁnancial market there would be a higher bid-ask spread (Glosten and
Milgrom (1985)).
8Private (or inside) information is believed to be pervasive in horse betting. See e.g., Crafts (1985).
4Upon observation of signal s, the prior belief q is updated according to Bayes’ rule
into the posterior belief p =P r ( x =1 |s). The posterior belief p is assumed to be dis-
tributed according to the continuous c.d.f. G with p.d.f. g on [0,1].9 By the law of iter-
ated expectations, the prior must satisfy q = E[p]=
R 1
0 pg (p)dp. The conditional p.d.f.
can be derived from g(p|x =1 )=pg (p)/q and g(p|x = −1) = (1 − p)g(p)/(1 − q) –
these relations are necessary, since Bayes’ rule yields p = qg(p|x =1 )/g (p) and 1 − p =
(1 − q)g(p|x = −1)/g (p).N o t et h a tg(p|x =1 )/g (p|x = −1) = (p/(1 − p))((1 − q)/q)
reﬂects the property that high beliefs in outcome 1 a r em o r ef r e q u e n tw h e no u t c o m e1 is
true. More strongly, strict monotonicity of the likelihood ratio in p implies that G(p|x =1 )
is strictly higher than G(p|x = −1) on the support, in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance: the diﬀerence G(p|x =1 ) −G(p|x = −1) < 0 for all p such that 0 <G(p) < 1.
Some of the results are derived under additional assumptions. The posterior distrib-
u t i o ni ss a i dt ob esymmetric if G(p|x =1 )=1− G(1 − p|x = −1), i.e. the chance of
posterior p conditional on state x =1is equal to the chance of posterior 1−p conditional
on state x = −1. The signal distribution is said to be unbounded if 0 <G(p) < 1 for all
p ∈ (0,1).
Our results are well illustrated by the linear signal example with conditional p.d.f.
f (s|x =1 ) = 2 s and f (s|x = −1) = 2(1 − s) for s ∈ [0,1], with corresponding c.d.f.
F (s|x =1 )=s2 and F (s|x = −1) = 2s − s2. This signal structure can be derived from
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After receiving the signal, the players have the opportunity to bet on x = −1 or x =1 .
The players are assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize the expected value of their
winning. We denote by ax the (possibly zero) amount of exogenously given pre-existing
bets on state x t h a th a v ea l r e a d yb e e np l a c e di na d v a n c eb yu n m o d e l e doutsiders (or “noise
bettors”). The total amount bet by insiders and outsiders is placed in a pool, from which a
proportional track take τ is taken, before distributing the pool evenly to the winning bets.
If no bets were placed on the winning outcome, no payment is made. Let bxi denote the
amount bet by player i on outcome x,a n dl e tbx denote the total amount bet by insiders
on outcome x.I fx is the winner, every unit bet on outcome x receives the payout
(1 − τ)
ax + bx + a−x + b−x
ax + bx
. (2.2)
9In the presence of discontinuities in the posterior belief distribution, the only symmetric equilibria
might involve mixed strategies. Our results can be extended to allow for these discontinuities.
53. Favorite-Longshot Bias
The goal of this section is to provide the simplest setting to illustrate how the favorite-
longshot bias may arise from informed betting and how its sign depends on the interplay
of noise and information. In this model there is a ﬁnite number N of informed players
forced to simultaneously submit exactly one bet each, there is no prior betting (ax =0 ),
and there is no track take (τ =0 ).10 These additional assumptions allow us to characterize
the equilibrium and study how it is aﬀected by changes in the informativeness of the signal
and the number of players (Section 3.1). We then show how the sign and magnitude of
the favorite longshot bias depend on the interplay of noise and information (Section 3.2).
3.1. Equilibrium Characterization
Consider a rational bettor with posterior p. The expected payoﬀ of a bet on outcome
y ∈ {−1,1} is U (y|p)=pW (y|x =1 )+( 1− p)W (y|x = −1) − 1 where W (y|x) is the
expected payoﬀ of a bet on outcome y conditional on state x being realized. Note that
U (1|p)=pW (1|x =1 ) −1 since W (y|x = −y)=0 ,a sab e to no u t c o m ey pays out nothing
in state −y. The conditional winning payoﬀ is random, because of the randomness of the
others’ signals and corresponding bets.
The best reply of each individual bettor has the following cutoﬀ characterization. There
exists a threshold posterior belief p∗ ∈ [0,1] such that for p<p ∗ it is optimal to bet on
x = −1,a n df o rp>p ∗ it is optimal to bet on x =1 .C l e a r l y∂U (1|p)/∂p = W (1|x =1 )>
0. As the best response must be a cutoﬀ strategy, we restrict attention without loss of
generality to cutoﬀ strategies and characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 1 With N ≥ 1 insiders, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in
which all bettors with p>ˆ pN bet for horse 1,a n db e t t o r sw i t hp<ˆ pN bet for horse −1,




1 − G(p|x =1 )
G(p|x = −1)
1 − (1 − G(p|x = −1))
N
1 − (G(p|x =1 ) )
N . (3.1)




1 − G(p|x =1 )
G(p|x = −1)
. (3.2)
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
10If players were not forced to bet, the logic of no trade theorem implies that there would be no betting
in equilibrium. In Section 5’s model the presence of positive outside bets allows the insiders to make
positive expected return when betting.
6With a large number of players, there is no uncertainty on the conditional distribution of
the opponents. In order to directly derive the symmetric equilibrium in the limit, consider
the expected payoﬀ achieved by a bettor with posterior p who bets on outcome 1.I f
winning, the bettor share the pool with all those who also picked 1. Since all bettors use the
same cutoﬀ strategy ˆ p, the fraction of bettors who picked 1 in state x =1is 1−G(ˆ p|x =1 ) .
The expected payoﬀ from a bet on outcome 1 is then p/(1 − G(ˆ p|x =1 ) ) . Similarly, the
expected payoﬀ from −1 is (1 − p)/G(ˆ p|x = −1).T h e p a y o ﬀ of an indiﬀerent bettor
satisﬁes equation (3.2).
3.2. Bias
The symmetric equilibrium strategy with N insiders has cutoﬀ posterior belief ˆ pN.T h e
resulting binomial distribution of bets is easily derived. For any k =0 ,...,N,





(1 − G(ˆ pN|x))
k G(ˆ pN|x)
N−k .
Since G(ˆ pN|x = −1) >G(ˆ pN|x =1 ) , the distribution of bets is higher when x =1than
when x = −1 in the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance order. This is a simple implication
of the fact that higher private beliefs are more frequent when the true outcome is higher,
resulting in more bets by the insiders on the higher outcome.
The market odds ratio for outcome 1,w h e nk have bet on outcome 1,i sρ =( N − k)/k.
A bet on outcome 1 pays out 1+ρ when winning – this parimutuel rule automatically
balances the book since the total payback equates the total amount bet, k(1 + ρ)=N.
The implied market probability for outcome 1 is k/N, equal to the fraction of money bet
on the corresponding horse. A Bayes-rational observer of the ﬁnal bets distribution would
instead update to the Bayesian odds ratio,
1 − q
q
Pr(exactly k bet 1|x = −1)





1 − G(ˆ pN|x = −1)
1 − G(ˆ pN|x =1 )
¶k µ
G(ˆ pN|x = −1)
G(ˆ pN|x =1 )
¶N−k
.
In general, this Bayesian odds ratio is diﬀerent from the market odds ratio.
As the ﬁnal distribution of market bets is not perfectly known when the bets are
placed, the market odds are not good estimators of the empirical odds, estimated from
the race outcomes. The Bayesian odds instead incorporate the information revealed in
the betting distribution and adjust for noise, and so are better estimators of the empirical
odds compared to the market odds. If our model is correctly speciﬁed, the Bayesian odds
should be equal on average to the empirical odds. The favorite-longshot bias identiﬁed in
the data suggests that the diﬀerence between the market odds ratio and our Bayesian odds
ratio is systematic: when the market odds ratio ρ is large (“long”), it is smaller than the
corresponding Bayesian odds ratio. Thus, a longshot is less likely to win than suggested
by the market odds.
7Our structural model allows us to uncover a systematic relation between Bayesian and
market odds depending on the interplay between the amount of noise and information
contained in the bettors’ signal. To appreciate the role played by noise,n o t et h a tm a r k e t
odds can range from zero to inﬁnity, depending on the realization of the signals. For
example, if most bettors happen to draw a low signal, the markets odds of outcome 1 will
be very long. If the signals contain little information, the Bayesian odds are close to the
prior odds even if the market odds are extreme. In this case, the deviation of the market
odds from the prior odds are largely due to the randomness contained in the signal, so
that the reverse of the favorite longshot bias is present (i.e., the market odds are more
extreme than the posterior odds).
As the number of bettors increases, the realized market odds contain more and more
information,s ot h a tt h ep o s t e r i o ro d d sa r em o r ea n dm o r ee x t r e m ef o ra n ym a r k e to d d s
diﬀerent from 1. We can therefore establish:













where ˆ p is the unique solution to the limit equilibrium condition (3.2). Take as given any
market odds ratio ρ ∈ (0,∞). As the number of insiders tends to inﬁnity, ρ is strictly
smaller (resp. greater) than the associated Bayesian odds ratio if and only if ρ>ρ ∗ (resp.
ρ<ρ ∗).








1 − G(ˆ pN|x = −1)
1 − G(ˆ pN|x =1 )
¶k µ
G(ˆ pN|x = −1)
G(ˆ pN|x =1 )
¶N−k
.
















1 − G(ˆ pN|x = −1)







G(ˆ pN|x = −1)
G(ˆ pN|x =1 )
¶
.
T h el e f th a n ds i d et e n d st oz e r oa sN tends to inﬁnity. The right hand side tends to a
positive limit, precisely since ρ>ρ ∗. ¤
For long market odds ρ, the market odds are shorter than the Bayesian odds, and vice
versa, in accordance with the favorite longshot bias. The turning point ρ∗ is a function
of how much more informative is the observation that the private belief exceeds ˆ p than
the observation that it falls short of ˆ p. The observation of ρ∗ insiders with beliefs below
8ˆ p exactly oﬀset the observation of one insider with beliefs above ˆ p, as can be seen from
expression (3.3).
In Proposition 2 the realized market odds ratio ρ ∈ (0,∞) is held constant as the
number of players N tends to inﬁnity. Since the probability distribution of ρ is aﬀected
by changes in N, it is natural to wonder whether this probability distribution of realized
market odds can become so extreme that it is irrelevant to look at ﬁxed non-extreme
realizations. This is not the case, because in the limit as N goes to inﬁnity the fraction of
bets on outcome 0 is positive and equal to G(ˆ p|x), while the remaining fraction 1−G(ˆ p|x)
is betting on outcome 1. By the strong law of large numbers, the noise vanishes and the
market odds ratio ρ tends almost surely to the limit ratio G(ˆ p|x)/(1 − G(ˆ p|x)) in state
x as the number of informed bettors increase. The observation of the bet distribution
eventually reveals the true outcome, so that the Bayesian odds ratio becomes more extreme
(either diverging to inﬁnity or converging to zero) as N tends to inﬁnity. It then becomes
more likely that the realized market odds are less extreme than the posterior odds. This
fact supports the favorite longshot bias as the theoretical prediction of our simple model.
In the special case with symmetric prior q =1 /2 and symmetric signal distribution
(implying that G(1/2|x =1 )=1−G(1/2|x = −1)), the symmetric equilibrium has ˆ pN =
ˆ p =1 /2 for all N. The turning point is then ρ∗ =1 .I nt h i ss i m p l i ﬁed case, we can further
illuminate the fact that the favorite longshot bias arises when the realized bets contain
more information than noise.
Proposition 3 Assume the prior belief is q =1 /2 and that the signal distribution is
s y m m e t r i c .T a k ea sg i v e na n ym a r k e to d d sr a t i oρ ∈ (0,∞). If the signal informativeness
G(1/2|x = −1)/G(1/2|x =1 )is suﬃciently large or the number of bettors N is large
enough, ρ is strictly smaller (resp. greater) than the associated Bayesian odds ratio if and
only if ρ>1 (resp. ρ<1).






1 − G(1/2|x = −1)




















Since ρ>1 and G(1/2|x = −1) >G(1/2|x =1 ) , all terms are positive. The right hand
side of (3.4) tends to inﬁnity when the informativeness ratio G(1/2|x = −1)/G(1/2|x =1 )
or the number of bettors N tend to inﬁnity. ¤
9As illustrated by the key inequality (3.4), the favorite longshot bias arises when bettors
are many (large N)o rw e l li n f o r m e d( l a r g eG(1/2|x = −1)/G(1/2|x =1 ) ). Since the left-
hand side of (3.4) is a strictly increasing function of ρ, it is harder to satisfy the inequality
for longer market odds. This is natural, since the insiders must reveal more information
through their bets in order for the Bayesian odds to become very long.
It is worth remarking that our result also holds when the insiders’ information contains
ac o m m o ne r r o r . 11 To illustrate this point, modify the model so that the true outcome is
z, while our previously used x is a binary signal of z. The private signal is only informative
about x, but conditionally on x, its distribution is independent of z. We show that in the
limit with inﬁnite N, the symmetric equilibrium features the favorite-longshot bias:
Proposition 4 Assume that G is symmetric and that the state x is a symmetric binary
signal of the outcome z of the race, with Pr(x =1 |z =1 )=P r( x = −1|z = −1) ≡ π>
1/2. The Bayesian odds ratio is more extreme than the market odds ratio associated to
the symmetric equilibrium of the limit game with an inﬁnite number of players.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Illustration. We now illustrate our ﬁndings in the linear signal example. Through the
monotonic translation of signals into posterior beliefs in (2.1), the cutoﬀ posterior be-
lief deﬁning the equilibrium corresponds to a cutoﬀ private signal ˆ sN. The equilibrium
condition (3.1) in terms of the cutoﬀ private signal is
q
1 − q
= P (ˆ sN,N) ≡
1 − ˆ sN
ˆ sN
1 − F (ˆ sN|x =1 )
F (ˆ sN|x = −1)
1 − (1 − F (ˆ sN|x = −1))
N
1 − (F (ˆ sN|x =1 ) )
N .
Figure 3.1 plots the equilibrium signal cutoﬀ ˆ sN (q) for diﬀerent values of N.As i n g l e
bettor (N =1 ) optimally bets on the horse that is more likely to win according to the
posterior belief. Note that for q<1/2, equilibrium betting is biased in favor of the “ex-
ante longshot” x =1 .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tap l a y e rw i n sw h e ny = x.B u ta c c o r d i n g
to the logic of the winner’s curse, conditionally on x the opponents receive information in
favor of x, and so they are more likely to bet on x. There is thus a positive correlation
of the true state and the number of bettors on it. This creates an incentive to bet on
the longshot, which tends to receive fewer bets. Observe that full rationality thus works
to reduce the favorite-longshot bias which would arise from the non-strategic betting rule
ˆ s =1− q. This adds to the strength of Proposition 2 which derived the favorite longshot
bias under the assumption of full rationality.
11In most situations there is often a common element of uncertainty. For instance, in horse races, the
insider information might show that one horse is in far better condition than publicly assessed, yet the
actual race contains an unforeseeable element of randomness, implying that this particular horse does not
necessarily win.















Figure 3.1: The equilibrium cutoﬀ signal ˆ sN in the linear signal example is plotted against
the prior belief q ∈ [0,1/2] for N =1 ,2,3,4,100000, in progressively thinner shade. The
downward sloping diagonal (ˆ s1 =1− q) corresponds to the optimal rule (ˆ p1 =1 /2)f o ra
single bettor. As the number of players increases, the cutoﬀ signal decreases and converges
to the limit ˆ s(q).
To further illustrate the favorite longshot bias, Figure 3.2 plots how the expected payoﬀ
of a bet on outcome 1 varies with the market odds in the symmetric case with q =1 /2.A s
F (1/2|x =1 )=1 /4 and F (1/2|x = −1) = 3/4, the Bayesian odds ratio reduces to 3N−2k.
The implied Bayesian probability is 32k/
¡
3N +3 2k¢
.S i n c e k have bet 1, the expected
return from an extra bet on outcome 1 is ((N +1 )/(k +1 ) )3 2k/
¡
3N +3 2k¢
.N o t i c et h e
similarity of the curve generated in this stylized example with Thaler and Ziemba’s (1988)
Figure 1, plotting the empirical expected return for horses with diﬀerent market odds.
When the market assigns long odds (a small probability) to an outcome (say, x =1 ), that
outcome wins less frequently than indicated by the market odds.
4. Early Betting with Market Power
S of a rw eh a v ea n a l y z e dag a m eo fs i m u l t a n e o u sb e t t i n g .W en o wt u r nt oad y n a m i cs e t t i n g
and investigate the factors conducive to simultaneous equilibrium play. We continue with
the model set up in Section 2 allowing for non-negative track take τ and prior bets ax.
Assume that time is discrete and that betting is open in a commonly known ﬁnite window
of time, with periods denoted by t =1 ,...,T.12 Assume also that the total amount of bets
placed by the outsiders, a−1 and a1, are deterministic, unaﬀected by the amounts bet by
the insiders, and commonly known. Following Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) “extended
12The assumption of discrete time is made for technical convenience, but seems inessential. Typically,
betting is open for a period before the beginning of the race and the bet distribution (and correspoinding
provisional odds) are displayed at regular intervals. For example, the UK’s Tote updates the display every
thirty seconds.









Figure 3.2: The expected return of a bet on outcome 1 is plotted against the natural
logarithm of the market odds ratio in the the linear signal example with prior q =1 /2 and
N =4players.
game with action commitment”, players decide when and how to bet, with the assumption
that players who bet late can observe the ﬁrm bets placed in earlier periods.
The timing of bets is aﬀected by the interplay of two opposing forces. First, players want
to bet early, in order to capture a good market share of proﬁtable bets, as in a Cournot
oligopoly game. Second, players want to bet late, in order not to reveal their private
information to the other bettors and maybe observe others.13 In the present Section 4 we
focus on the ﬁrst incentive by considering a model with a ﬁnite number of large bettors
who share the same information and are able to inﬂuence odds. In this ﬁrst case, we show
that in equilibrium all (but at most one) bettors place their bets early. In the next Section
5 we isolate the second incentive by considering a continuum of small bettors. In that
second case we show that in equilibrium informed bets are placed late.
To study the eﬀect of market power, assume that insiders can place bets of arbitrary
non-negative size. A player who can make a sizable bet faces an adverse movement in the
odds, and should consider this eﬀect when deciding how much to bet. This market power
channel introduces an incentive to bet early, before other players place their bet to one’s
detriment.
Following Hurley and McDonough (1995), assume that there is no private information,
in that the N rational bettors share the same information about the state. In our setup of
Section 2, this is the degenerate case with no (or completely uninformative) private signal,
so that p = q =P r( x =1 )for sure. The amounts bet by other bettors cannot then reveal
any information. If the common prior belief, the track take and prior bets are such that
q(1 − τ) >a 1/(a1 + a−1), the prior bets are so favorable that it is proﬁtable to place bets
13This eﬀect is also present in an open auction with ﬁxed deadline. See also the discussion in Roth and
Ockenfels (2001) and Medrano and Vives (2001).
12on outcome 1, but it is unproﬁtable to bet on outcome −1. If bettors i =1 ,...,N place
the amounts b1,...,b N on outcome 1,p l a y e ri’s payoﬀ is
Ui (bi)=q(1 − τ)







The model allows a direct mapping into Cournot model of imperfect competition. To
see this, interpret the amount bi as the quantity produced at constant marginal unit cost
by ﬁrm i. The market for the output has the inverse demand curve
p(b)=q(1 − τ)
a1 + a−1 + b
a1 + b
, (4.1)
where b is the aggregate quantity produced. Bettors suﬀer inframarginal losses from
increasing their own bets and so do not bet until the marginal price of an extra unit
equates the marginal cost. In simultaneous equilibrium, the market’s subjective probabil-
ity (a1 + b)/(a1 + a−1 + b) for outcome 1 is lower than the proﬁt-eliminating q(1 − τ),f o r
the usual reason that demand is above marginal cost (p(b) > 1).
To derive the equilibrium timing, we can appeal to a result by Matsumura (1999):
Proposition 5 With N informed bettors, there are two subgame perfect equilibria. In
the ﬁrst, all bettors place early bets. In the second equilibrium, all but one bettor place
early bets.
Proof. The following three conditions about the two-stage betting game with exogenous
timing and arbitrary pre-existing bets can be veriﬁed to be satisﬁed (details available on
request):
1. In any two-stage game with exogenous sequencing, there exists a pure strategy equi-
librium and the equilibrium is unique.
2. If the number of followers is one, this follower strictly prefers the Cournot outcome
to the follower’s outcome.
3. If the number of leaders is one, this leader strictly prefers the leader’s outcome to
the Cournot outcome.
This game then veriﬁes the three assumptions of Matsumura’s (1999) Proposition 3,
proving the result. ¤
It follows that almost all bettors move simultaneously at the earliest possible instance,
e.g. after they have received their public information.14 Market power gives an incentive
14Following Matsumura, players do not observe their simultaneous opponents before placing bets. If we
relax this assumption, then the lone follower would deviate to produce simultaneously with all the others.
13to move early, to capture a good share of the money on the table. This prediction is at
odds with Asch, Malkiel and Quandt’s (1982) observation of late informed betting. As
shown in the next section, individual bettors have an incentive to bet late if they instead
have private information about the money on the table.
5. Late Betting with Private Information
In this section we isolate the incentive to bet late for informational reasons by deliberately
removing market power. We show that there is no advantage to betting early for individuals
who can only bet a small ﬁxed amount of money and so have no inframarginal bets. As
bettors are only marginal, the ﬁnal payout will not depend on a given player’s bet. Thus
t h eb e tw i l ln o td i r e c t l ya ﬀect the attractiveness of the bets to other players. However, an
early bet has the potential to send a signal to other players about one’s private information.
But it is unattractive to send such a signal, since other players will tend to follow the signal
and erode the value of one’s private information. Moreover, delaying a marginal bet gives
an informational advantage if one observes the others’ bets placed in the meantime.
In order to completely remove the players’ market power, from now on we assume that
the insider population is a continuum of size N and that each player can place a size-one
b e ta tm o s to n c e . 15 Equivantly, the insiders can only place a relatively small bet due to
liquidity constraints. With a continuum of players, the actual distribution of beliefs in the
population equals the probability distribution G. Compared to Section 3, we now allow
the insiders the option to abstain from betting. While players have discretion over whether
to bet or not, the smallness of each individual allows us to consider the eﬀect of private
information in isolation, without consideration for market power.
A behavior strategy speciﬁes after each publicly observed history and privately observed
signal whether to bet now on horse 1, bet now on horse −1, or abstain in this period. A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium speciﬁes a behavior strategy for each player, such that every
player’s strategy is optimal given the other players’ strategies. Perfection requires that the
continuation strategy should be optimal after any publicly observed history, given rational
beliefs. We analyze this timing game using backwards induction, and therefore begin by
considering the last period.
5.1. Informed Betting in the Last Stage
This section focuses on last-minute simultaneous betting by a continuum of small informed
bettors. By allowing for a positive track take, the option that rational informed bettors
15Issues of market manipulation cannot arise in this setting with unit irrevocable bets. See also Camerer
(1998) on the limited eﬀectiveness of market manipulati o ni np a r i m u t u e lm a r k e t s .
14withhold from betting, and the presence of pre-existing bets, the rational bettors make non-
negative expected returns when betting. We can then develop testable comparative statics
predictions of the theory. For the purpose of our dynamic analysis, we are particularly
interested in the observation that the higher is the prior belief in outcome x,t h es h o r t e r
are the equilibrium market odds for outcome x.
The distribution G of private beliefs now refers to the distribution in the sub-population
that has not bet before the last period. The information contained in the publicly observed
history of the game is applied to the prior belief of the previous period, resulting in a
publicly updated new prior belief q common to all players. The distribution F of signals
in the remaining population is simply the re-normalized version of the original distribution
truncated with the early bettors. The belief distribution G is then re-derived as in Section
2. We will eventually show that this distribution F is the same as the original distribution.
A possible change in history which aﬀects the prior q therefore has a predictable eﬀect on
G.I fq is increased, all signals are updated to higher beliefs than before, and so G is more
favorable.
In simultaneous Bayesian Nash equilibrium, every bettor correctly predicts the fraction
of the informed who bet on each outcome in each state. Denote by bx
y the amount bet
by the insiders on outcome y when state x is true. If state x is true, the payout to bets
on outcome x is W (x|x)=( 1− τ)
¡





1) > 0. Observe directly
that 1/W (1|1)+1/W (−1| − 1) = 1/(1 − τ) – the fractions of the betted money paid to
winners sum to the total fraction of money paid out.
Consider now the decision problem of a player with belief p. The expected payoﬀ
from betting on outcome 1 is U (1|p)=pW (1|1) − 1.O n o u t c o m e −1 the expected
payoﬀ is U (−1|p)=( 1− p)W (−1| − 1) − 1.T h ep a y o ﬀ from not betting is U (0|p)=0 .
Immediately, we observe that U (1|p)−U (0|p) and U (0|p)−U (−1|p) are increasing in p.
The best response is therefore a cutoﬀ policy. There exists some ˆ p−1, ˆ p1 ∈ [0,1] such that
for p<ˆ p−1 it is optimal to bet on x = −1,a n df o rp>ˆ p1 it is optimal to bet on x =1 .
If interior to the belief distribution, the two cutoﬀ values can be determined from
the indiﬀerence conditions 0=ˆ p1W (1|1) − 1 and 0=( 1− ˆ p−1)W (−1| − 1) − 1.S i n c e
W (x|x) > 0 we immediately ﬁnd that ˆ p1 > 0 and ˆ p−1 < 1.W h e n τ>0,t h ei d e n t i t y
1/W (1|1) + 1/W (−1| − 1) = 1/(1 − τ) implies ˆ p−1 < ˆ p1 – a positive track take thus
implies that some players refrain from betting.
Under some circumstances, there will be no betting on a given outcome in equilibrium.
For instance, when the prior bets heavily favor outcome 1 or the track take is very large
(i.e., (1 − τ)(a1 + a−1 + N) ≤ a1), we have W (1|1) < 1, so that in equilibrium no bets
a r ep l a c e do no u t c o m e1. Likewise, when (1 − τ)(a1 + a−1 + N) ≤ a−1 there is no betting
on outcome −1. We now provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
with positive betting on both outcomes:










There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all players use interior thresh-
olds 0 < ˆ p−1 < ˆ p1 < 1.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤







−1. Given the presence of a continuum of insiders, there is no
noise in the betting, resulting in an extreme version of the favorite longshot bias. Thus,
the amounts bet by the insiders fully reveal the true outcome. The favorite longshot bias
derived in Section 3 then carries over in the presence of prior bets and a positive track
take.
If τ>a 1/(a1 + a−1), the prior bets have given market odds so unbalanced, that even
a bettor who knows that outcome −1 will happen for sure is unwilling to bet on outcome
−1. In this sense, prior bets are such that there is no arbitrage opportunity. It is possible,
however, that rational bets placed on outcome 1 would be suﬃcient to make betting on
outcome −1 attractive – the proposition did not address the case a1/(a1 + a−1) <τ<
(a1 + N)/(a1 + a−1 + N).E v e n w h e n a1/(a1 + a−1) <τ , if no bettor received private
beliefs near p =0 , there might not be any one willing to bet on outcome −1.T oo b t a i n
an interior equilibrium with positive betting on both outcomes, the proposition assumes
that the market odds are balanced relative to the track take, and that some bettors receive
arbitrarily strong signals in favor of either outcome.
Our ﬁrst comparative statics result is an intuitive property that is very helpful for
the dynamic analysis. If a player makes an early bet on outcome 1 in equilibrium, this
will signal to the market that he has private information in favor of this outcome. This
favorable signal implies that the later players have a higher prior belief q than if the signal
had not been sent. Intuitively, they are then more inclined to bet on outcome 1,d r i v i n g
down the payout W (1|1). The signal therefore tends to reduce the proﬁt to the signaling
player. For now, we characterize the eﬀect on the outcome of the last stage of the game:










A marginal increase in q implies that ˆ p1 and ˆ p−1 both weakly increase, that W (1|1) weakly
decreases, and that W (−1| − 1) weakly increases.
16Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
In a symmetric setting, we can derive more detailed comparative statics results:
Proposition 8 Assume that the distribution of private beliefs is unbounded and symmet-
ric. Assume symmetry of the prior bets, a1 = a−1 ≡ a>0,a n dt h a t0 <τ<1/2.T h e r e
exists a unique symmetric-policy Nash equilibrium, where bettors with beliefs exceeding
the threshold ˆ p1 ∈ (1/2,1) bet on outcome 1, bettors with beliefs below 1 − ˆ p1 bet on
outcome −1, and all other bettors place no bet. The threshold ˆ p1 is a function of τ and
a/N,i n c r e a s i n gi nτ and decreasing in a/N. A decrease in a/N, or a decrease in τ,b o t h
imply more extreme market odds and result in a reduced favorite-longshot bias.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Intuitively, a greater track take makes rational betting less attractive, so that only
bettors with higher beliefs in an outcome ﬁnd it attractive. With a smaller amount of
uninformed betting, or a greater total population of rational players, the bets placed by
the extreme-signal informed players have a greater impact on the market odds, thereby
making informed betting less attractive for individuals with a given signal. Although the
increase in N or decrease in a reduce the fraction 2(1− ˆ p1) of active bettors, the informed
population gains size relative to the prior bets, and so their bets have a larger inﬂuence on
the market odds. For very large values of N, the market probability for outcome 1 tends
only to 1/(1 − τ) – the positive track take prevents the informed population from fully
correcting the odds.
The symmetric setting has the appealing property that the initial market belief in
outcome 1, a1/(a1 + a−1) equals the prior belief q =1 /2. A priori, then, the mar-
ket odds are correct, and there is no scope for betting on the basis of public infor-
mation alone. Nevertheless, privately informed individuals can proﬁt from betting. In






−1, so the market probability satis-
ﬁes (a + b1
1)/
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.T h e f a v o r i t e -
longshot bias is clear: when the market’s implied probability of an outcome exceeds 1/2,
but remains well below 1, the Bayesian (and empirical) probability of the outcome is 1.
Illustration. In the linear signal example with fair prior (q =1 /2), balanced pre-existing
bets (a1 = a−1 = a), and track take τ ≤ 1/2, the unique symmetric-policy Nash equilib-
rium has a simple explicit expression, with cutoﬀ signal
ˆ s1 =










Having analyzed the last period play, we can ﬁnally argue in favor of late informed betting.




a1 + a−1 + N
,
a−1
a1 + a−1 + N
¾
.
Postponing all betting to the last period is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. The following strategy proﬁle constitutes such a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
After any history, all remaining players postpone their betting to the last period and
play then a simultaneous Bayesian Nash equilibrium with the updated belief distribution
G. If some players have already moved, they are removed from the distribution of the
private signal F, and if the early-movers signalled some information then the public prior
is updated and G changed accordingly.
To prove that this is an equilibrium, consider any public history at time t<T.I no n e
case, the resulting belief distribution is no longer thought unbounded. In this case, the
true state must have been revealed when the extreme-belief players were moving. Then, all
remaining players will in the ﬁnal period bet on the winning outcome, either until there are
no more players, or until its return is driven to zero. Every player is therefore indiﬀerent
to betting now or later, and might as well postpone.
In the other case, the belief distribution is still unbounded. The bets cx of players
who already bet will in the ﬁnal period be treated as pre-existing, but notice that the
condition τ<a x/(ax + a−x + N) ≤ (ax + cx)/(ax + a−x + cx + c−x) is still satisﬁed in
the last period. Suppose that some player considers a deviation to bet now, without loss
of generality on outcome 1. Since outcome 1 is more attractive the higher is the private
belief, the oﬀ-path belief of all other players is to update q to a higher value. Since
the player is marginal, the same continuum of players as otherwise is still present, and
according to their equilibrium strategy they proceed to the simultaneous game at time
T. By Proposition 7, the higher continuation belief implies a weak decrease in the payout
W (1|1) for bets on outcome 1. But this player is then at least as well oﬀ delaying the bet
on outcome 1, thereby earning the non-decreased payout in state 1. It is then optimal for
this player to postpone. ¤
6. Conclusion
We have proposed a novel explanation of both the favorite longshot bias and the timing
of informative bets, based on a simple model with initial bets from “noise” bettors and
18late bets from small privately informed proﬁt maximizing bettors. As a by-product of our
analysis, we have developed some tractable models of simultaneous betting in parimutuel
markets with private information.
The ﬁrst insight gained from our analysis is that the market odds are typically diﬀerent
from the empirical odds if bettors place bets without knowing the ﬁnal distribution of
market bets. The sign and extent of the favorite longshot bias depends on the interaction
of noise and information. In the presence of little private information, posterior odds are
close to prior odds, even with extreme market odds, so that deviations of market odds from
prior odds are mostly due to the noise contained in the signal. In this case, the market
odds tend to be more extreme than the posterior odds, resulting in a reversed favorite-
longshot bias. As the number of bettors increases, the realized market odds contain more
information and less noise. For any ﬁxed market odds, the posterior odds are then more
extreme, resulting in increased favorite-longshot bias. The favorite longshot bias always
arises with a large number of bettors, provided that they have some private information.
Using the market odds to evaluate the rationality of the bettors is equivalent to assum-
ing too much information on their side. It is tantamount to requiring that bettors know
the ﬁnal distribution of bets, which they do not with simultaneous betting. If betting were
allowed to unexpectedly reopen, additional bets would be placed to rebalance the market
odds toward the posterior odds, eliminating the puzzle.
In order to test this ﬁrst prediction of our theory, one could exploit the existing variation
across betting environments. The presence and degree of private information tend to vary
consistently depending on the nature of the underlying sport or prominence of the event.
For example, there are probably more punters with inside information about the outcome
of horse races rather than football matches. The amount of noise present depends on the
number of punters, as well as on the observability of the bets previously posted. Our model
predicts a reverse favorite-longshot bias if bettors have little or no private information and
cannot observe the bets placed by others (e.g., in lotto games).16
Similarly to Isaacs’ (1953) market power explanation and Hurley and McDonough’s
(1995) limited arbitrage explanation, our informational resolution of the favorite longshot
bias is speciﬁc to the parimutuel market structure. These three theories do not apply
to ﬁxed odd betting, in which the bias is also often observed, and so complement other
explanations proposed for the bias in ﬁxed odds betting markets. Sharing with Shin (1992)
the assumption of privately informed bettors, we provide a parimutuel counterpart of his
adverse selection explanation. The behavioral and risk loving explanations instead predict
the presence of the bias regardless of the market structure, but cannot account for the
varying extent of the bias in diﬀerent countries and are mute on the timing issues.
16The preponderance of noise might account for some of Metrick’s (1996) ﬁndings in NCAA betting.
19Secondly, this paper has contributed to the analysis of endogenous timing. The incen-
tive of informed traders to postpone their trades to the last minute is driven by the fact
that in parimutuel betting all trades are executed at the same ﬁnal price. In ﬁxed odds
betting and normal ﬁnancial markets (e.g., as modeled in Kyle’s (1985) continuous auc-
tion model), competition among informed traders drive them to trade as early as possible,
thereby revealing their information early.17 If at all needed, subsequent arbitrage trading
then eliminates the favorite-longshot bias.
We have identiﬁed (in Section 5) a scenario with many small bettors in which all
informed bets are placed at the end of the betting period, but for our insight to apply it
is enough that some informed bets are placed simultaneously at the end. We have also
pointed out (in Section 4) that large bettors have a tempering incentive to place early bet,
especially if they are not concerned about the information revealed to others. The analysis
of the interplay of these two incentives is an interesting topic for future research.
Our theoretical ﬁndings seem compatible with experimental results recently obtained by
Plott, Wit and Yang (2003) in laboratory parimutuel markets. Their experimental subjects
were endowed with limited monetary budget and given private signals informative about
the likelihood of the diﬀerent outcomes. Subjects could place bets up to their budget before
the random termination of the markets. Compared to our model, the presence of a random
termination time gives bettors an additional incentive to move early in order to reduce the
termination risk. Although the experimental subjects were explained Bayes’ rule, not all
proﬁtable bets were made and some favorite-longshot bias was observed. According to the
logic of our theory, the market odds were not equalized to the posterior odds because some
of the informed bettors were possibly postponing the placement of their limited budget,
gambling on the termination to happen later.
Persistent cross-country diﬀerences in the observed biases could be attributed to varying
degrees of market participation and informational asymmetry, patterns in the coexistence
of parallel (ﬁxed odd and parimutuel) betting schemes, and degrees of randomness in the
closing time in parimutuel markets. As also suggested by Gabriel and Marsden (1990) and
Bruce and Johnson (2000), bettors might have diﬀerent incentives to place their bets on
the parimutuel system rather than with the bookmakers depending on the quality of their
information. The consistently diﬀe r e n te x t e n to ff a v o r i t el o n g s h o tb i a sd e p e n d i n go nt h e
market rules observed in the UK points to their relevance in determining the behavior of
market participants on the supply and demand side.
The incentives to reveal information depend on the market structure and might ex-
plain the long-term performance of diﬀerent trading institutions. The investigation of the
implications of these results for the design of parimutuel markets is left to future research.
17See Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
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22Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We look for a symmetric equilibrium, in which each player
adopts the same cutoﬀ ˆ p. Consider the best reply ˇ p of a player against all other players
using ˆ p. Given that the other players use the cutoﬀ ˆ p, the best response cutoﬀ ˇ p is such
that the bettor with belief ˇ p is indiﬀerent between betting on either of the two horses,
U (1|ˇ p)=U (−1|ˇ p), i.e.
ˇ p
1 − ˇ p
=
W (−1|x = −1)
W (1|x =1 )
. (A.1)
Due to the assumption that players are forced to bet one unit each, the total pool of
money to be shared among the winners is always equal to N. The conditional expected
payoﬀ when winning is obtained by using the cutoﬀ strategies adopted by all opponents
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N−k =1 . Thus the conditional expected payoﬀs when winning
are
W (1|x =1 )=
1 − (G(ˆ p|x =1 ) )
N
1 − G(ˆ p|x =1 )
, (A.2)
and
W (−1|x = −1) =
1 − (1 − G(ˆ p|x = −1))
N
G(ˆ p|x = −1)
. (A.3)
At a symmetric equilibrium we have ˇ p =ˆ p, yielding equation (3.1) after substitution
of (A.2) and (A.3) into the equilibrium condition (A.1). Uniqueness of the solution follows
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 3 . 1 )i sstrictly increasing, ranging from zero to inﬁn-
ity as p ranges over (0,1), while the right hand side of (3.1) is weakly decreasing in p since
W (1|x =1 )=
PN−1
k=0 (G(ˆ p|x =1 ) )
k /N is increasing in ˆ p and similarly W (−1|x = −1) is
decreasing in ˆ p.
23Finally, let p∗ be the unique solution to the limit equation (3.2) and let an arbitrary
ε>0 be given. By monotonicity, at p∗ + ε the left hand side of (3.2) exceeds the right
hand side. By pointwise convergence of the right hand side of (3.1) to the right hand side
of (3.2), for suﬃciently large N, the left hand side of (3.1) exceeds the right hand side at
p∗ + ε. A symmetric argument shows that for suﬃciently large N,t h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f
(3.1) exceeds the left hand side at p∗ − ε. It follows that ˆ pN ∈ (p∗ − ε,p∗ + ε) when N is
suﬃciently large. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. With a signal realization s that induces private belief p
we now have Pr(x = z =1 |s)=P r ( z =1 |x =1)Pr(x =1 |s)=πp. If all players use
symmetric strategies, we have W (y =1 |x = z =1 )=W (y = −1|x = z = −1) ≡ α and
W (y =1 |x =1 ,z= −1) = W (y = −1|x =1 ,z= −1) ≡ β. The expected payoﬀ from a
betonoutcome1 is U (y =1 |p)=πpα+(1 − π)(1− p)β while U (y = −1|p)=π(1 − p)α+
(1 − π)pβ.N o w U (y =1 |p) − U (y = −1|p) is weakly increasing in p if and only if
πα ≥ (1 − π)β.
We now show that πα ≥ (1 − π)β.I fi n s t e a dπα < (1 − π)β, a symmetric equilibrium
should necessarily have a cut-oﬀ at 1/2, but since those with p>1/2 should then bet on
outcome −1,t h e r ew o u l db em o r eb e t so nt h i so u t c o m ew h e nx =1 ,a n ds oα>β .S i n c e
also π>1 − π, this is incompatible with πα < (1 − π)β, a contradiction.
If πα ≥ (1 − π)β holds with equality, then π>1 − π implies α<β . If the inequality
is strict, then the unique equilibrium has a cut-oﬀ at 1/2, and since more people bet on
outcome 1 when x =1 , we get again α<β . I nt h el i m i tw i t hi n ﬁnite N, there is no
uncertainty about how much is bet on outcome y given x. Since the remaining amount
is bet on y = −1,w eo b t a i nt h er e l a t i o n1=1 /W (y = z|x = z)+1 /W (y = z|x 6= z)=
1/α +1 /β.S i n c e W (y =1 |x = z =1 )=α<β ,o u t c o m e1 is the favorite when x =1 .
Having observed that outcome 1 has odds W (y =1 |x = z =1 ) , one can infer that x =1 ,
and so the Bayesian probability for outcome z =1is π =P r( z =1 |x =1 ) . The expected
return on the favorite, πα, is then immediately weakly greater than the expected return
on the longshot, (1 − π)β, by the inequality πα ≥ (1 − π)β. More strongly, the favorite-
longshot bias carries over as π ≥ 1/α, so that the favorite has greater Bayesian odds than
market odds. This inequality is true, since 1=1 /α+1/β c a nb es o l v e df o rβ = α/(α − 1)
and πα ≥ (1 − π)β then boils down to π ≥ 1/α. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . In a symmetric equilibrium, all individuals use the same cutoﬀ
policy. The amounts bet are then b1
1 = N (1 − G(ˆ p1|x =1 ) ) , b
−1
1 = N (1 − G(ˆ p1|x = −1)),
b1
−1 = NG(ˆ p−1|x =1 ) ,a n db
−1
−1 = NG(ˆ p−1|x = −1). The indiﬀerence conditions charac-




a1 + N (1 − G(ˆ p1|x =1 ) )






a−1 + NG(ˆ p−1|x = −1)
a1 + a−1 + N (1 − G(ˆ p1|x = −1)) + NG(ˆ p−1|x = −1)
. (A.5)
First, we show existence. The product set of ˆ p−1 in [1−(a−1+N)/(1−τ)(a1+a−1+N),1]
with ˆ p1 in [0,(a1 + N)/(1 − τ)(a1 + a−1 + N)] is non-empty, convex, and compact. With
the convention that G(p)=0when p<0 and G(p)=1when p>1, the right hand sides
of (A.4) and (A.5) continuously map this set into itself. We already noted that ˆ p1 > 0
and ˆ p−1 < 1. It is immediate to see that ˆ p1 ≤ (a1 + N)/(1 − τ)(a1 + a−1 + N),a n d
ˆ p−1 ≥ 1−(a−1 + N)/(1 − τ)(a1 + a−1 + N).B r o u w e r ’ sﬁx e dp o i n tt h e o r e mt h e ni m p l i e s
the existence of a solution to (A.4) and (A.5) within this product set. But such a solution
must further satisfy ˆ p1 < 1. To see this, assume on the contrary that ˆ p1 ≥ 1. Then the right
hand side of (A.4) is a1/(1 − τ)(a1 + a−1 + NG(ˆ p−1|y =1 ) )≤ a1/(1 − τ)(a1 + a−1) < 1,
by the assumption that τ<a −1/(a1 + a−1). But then the right hand side of (A.4) is
strictly less than one, contradicting that ˆ p1 ≥ 1 solves (A.4). A similar argument proves
that ˆ p−1 > 0.
Second, we show uniqueness. Assume that there are two diﬀerent solutions (ˆ p−1, ˆ p1)
and (ˇ p−1, ˇ p1) to equations (A.4) and (A.5), and assume without loss of generality that
ˆ p1 > ˇ p1. From the indiﬀerence conditions ˆ p1 ˆ W (1|1) − 1=ˇ p1 ˇ W (1|1) − 1=0it follows
that ˆ W (1|1) < ˇ W (1|1).F r o mt h ei d e n t i t y1/W (1|1) + 1/W (−1| − 1) = 1/(1 − τ),t h e n
ˆ W (−1| − 1) > ˇ W (−1| − 1).F r o mt h ei n d i ﬀerence conditions (1 − ˆ p−1) ˆ W (−1| − 1)−1=
(1 − ˇ p−1) ˇ W (−1| − 1) − 1=0we conclude ˆ p−1 > ˇ p−1.T h e n ˆ b1
−1/N = G(ˆ p−1|x =1 )≥
G(ˇ p−1|x =1 )=ˇ b1
−1/N.F r o m ˆ b1
−1 ≥ ˇ b1
−1 and (1 − τ)
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ˆ W (1|1) < ˇ W (1|1) = (1 − τ)
¡









it follows that ˆ b1
1 > ˇ b1
1.T h u s
1 − G(ˆ p1|x =1 )> 1 − G(ˇ p1|x =1 ) , which is possible only if ˆ p1 < ˇ p1. This contradiction
establishes the result. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . Observe that 0=ˆ p1W (1|1) − 1,s oˆ p1 increases if and
only if W (1|1) decreases. Assume on the contrary, that W (1|1) increases. By the
identity 1/W (1|1) + 1/W (−1| − 1) = 1/(1 − τ),t h e nW (−1| − 1) decreases. By 0=
(1 − ˆ p−1)W (−1| − 1) − 1,t h e nˆ p−1 decreases. Since q increases, b1
−1/N = G(ˆ p−1|x =1 )
weakly decreases. Since W (1|1) = (1 − τ)
¡






must be that b1
1/N =1 − G(ˆ p1|x =1 ) decreases. Since q increases, this is possible
only if ˆ p1 increases. But this implies the contradiction that W (1|1) decreases. We have
25thus proved that ˆ p1 weakly increases and W (1|1) weakly decreases. Again, by the iden-
tity 1/W (1|1) + 1/W (−1| − 1) = 1/(1 − τ),t h e nW (−1| − 1) weakly increases, and by
0=( 1− ˆ p−1)W (−1| − 1) − 1,t h e nˆ p−1 weakly increases. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . Using the assumptions and ˆ p1 =1− ˆ p−1, condition (A.5)
directly reduces to condition (A.4). Either condition can be rewritten as
(1 − τ)ˆ p1 =
a/N +1− G(ˆ p1|y =1 )
2a/N +1− G(ˆ p1|y =1 )+1− G(ˆ p1|y = −1)
. (A.6)
The right hand side of (A.6) is continuous in ˆ p1.A t1/2 it strictly exceeds the left hand
side, while the opposite is true at 1. Thus there exists a solution to this equation in
(1/2,1). At any solution, the right hand side is a strictly decreasing function of ˆ p1.T o
see this, take the logarithm of the right hand side, diﬀerentiate and use symmetry of G to
arrive at the desired inequality
a/N +1− G(ˆ p1|y =1 )
a/N +1− G(ˆ p1|y = −1)
<
g(ˆ p1|y =1 )
g(ˆ p1|y = −1)
=
ˆ p1




a/N +1− G(ˆ p1|y =1 )
2a/N +1− G(ˆ p1|y =1 )+1− G(ˆ p1|y = −1)
,
which is implied by (A.6) and τ>0. This proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
We now turn to the comparative statics results, still analyzing from equation (A.6).
T h ed i r e c te ﬀect on the left hand side of an increase in τ is negative, so an increase in τ
implies an increase in ˆ p1. In turn, the market odds on the right hand side was decreased.
An increase in a/N will decrease the right hand side, so ˆ p1 falls. Since the left hand side
falls, the market odds ratio on the right hand side also falls. ¤
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